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by the federal government. It embodies extensive tax and spending policy
decisions and, as such, reflects its interpretation of the economy’s prospect.At
the same time, it serves also to signal to society and to the marketplace.
Moreover, the budget has the ability to invoke significant consequences,
intentionally or otherwise, onto the economic and social welfare of the public
and of commerce.
But as federal budget deficits have increasingly become a condition of the
past, so too has the observable concern of the general public over budgetary
balance. With an 11-year record of repeat budgetary surpluses boosting
confidence in the soundness of public finances, there is seemingly little cause
for the general population to receive the budget exercise as possibly anything
but complex, overwhelming, redundant or even boring. Moreover, there is
certain apathy within the Canadian fabric as the electorate attempts to
decipher policy dimensions from political banter. Generally speaking, public
interest in the federal budget mounts twice a year; when it is tabled (usually
in February – March), and, when announcing economic and fiscal update
(usually in October – November).We may also witness renewed interest when
unanticipated announcements on new policy initiatives are made. Interestingly
though, this attention has primarily been mobilized over the past several years
by speculative behaviour around fiscal incentives the government may have to
offer the public. Of course, potential calls for an election can also attract
budget debate as is the case at the time of writing of this paper.
With a particular curiosity around how public Canada emerged into an era of
fiscal surplus, the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada
(CGA-Canada) set out to better understand the fiscal process and to impart
that insight to everyday Canadians. With that goal in mind, we would premise
the following pages with an acknowledgement that Canada is not on the brink
of fiscal distress. And while we do not purport to enlighten the experts, we do
anticipate that this paper can highlight the opportunity before us.
That opportunity resides in calling on government to eliminate national debt,
controlling expenses with a view to investment and renewal, and prescribing
tax revenue models which are most efficient over those which tax capital
investment, innovation and productivity.And while intuitive, we must explicitly
remind ourselves that Canada must look at the economic long term. That
Foreword
78
long term view looks to stabilization of the revenue stream, responsible and
efficient program delivery and a continued diligence in drawing down the
debt; both with dedicated planned surpluses and with surprise surpluses when
they materialize.
Anthony Ariganello, CPA (Delaware), FCGA
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Certified General Accountants Association of Canada9
Quite naturally, budgetary and fiscal policy finds much higher resonance
amongst public policy analysts, interest groups, lobbyists, think tanks and
academia than the general public. The debate however is heavily skewed
towards the mix and level of taxation, and the fiscal relationship between
different levels of governments. Since the challenge of chronic federal deficits
has seemingly been resolved for the time being, it is not unusual for the
budgetary balance (i.e. surplus) to fade as the focus of attention. Time will
reveal if that holds true as the pendulum of budgetary balance slows or
regresses as some are already predicting. Over recent years though, we have
witnessed how the surplus does attract attention when financial results or new
policy initiatives are announced. Interestingly, the debate has been directed
not so much at the surplus itself, but rather at the different options in
spending it. Reducing taxes and/or increasing spending have so far been the
two preferred alternatives.
There has been, for some time, a steady call for tax cuts. Research findings
suggest that Canada’s tax rates (statutory, effective and marginal) are high and
not internationally competitive, while the current tax system is also seen as
impeding investment and innovation. Already introduced tax cuts have been
skewed towards reducing ‘good’ taxes, such as the GST, while leaving
economically ineffective tax effects almost unchanged. And those measures
tend to accentuate that lower income Canadians pay relatively modest taxes,
particularly in the form of income tax, and resultantly benefit little from tax
cuts in absolute terms.
Alternatively, the widely debated issues of declining quality of health care,
deteriorating state of the public infrastructure, and importance of human
capital in the knowledge economy may suggest that surpluses are better directed
towards increasing government spending and transfers to the provinces to
pursue targeted programs.
Another popular option for using the surplus lies in repaying the national debt
which may ease the burden of paying debt charges and free future resources.
As we have learned from a number of oil-producing countries, approaches
can be adopted to channel budget surpluses into the build up of a strategic
fund. The borrow-and-invest strategy which is often suggested to households
mayalsobebeneficialfortheeconomy.This,forinstance,mayallowgovernment
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Over recent years, the
policy debate has been
directed not so much
at the surplus itself, but
rather at the different
options in spending it10
to focus on investing the surplus in innovation and technology, or other return-
generating areas.
It should be noted however that the issues identified above rightfully seem to
be part of a general public policy exchange on the ways to improve our economy,
ensure a stronger growth, increase employment prospects, international
competitiveness, higher return on investment and overall improvement in
living standards. A similar discussion could take place even under a balanced
(i.e. zero deficit / zero surplus) budget. The major difference would be in
shifting the focus from “how to spend the surplus” to “how to spend the budget
revenue”. Intuitively at least, it is worth asking the question of whether the
constantly reappearing federal budget surpluses are desirable in the first place?
One might argue that with the current conditions of a sharp slowdown in
the U.S. economy, ongoing dislocations in global financial markets and the
overall weakening growth in the global economy, the question of having
federal surpluses may simply be irrelevant. A conclusive rebuttal to this view
may not be available before the fall of 2009 when the government closes its
books for the 2008-09 fiscal year. Importantly however, Canada has shown
over recent years a strong resilience to economic shocks that have shaken the
world. Neither the late 1990s crisis on the Asian financial markets, nor the
collapse of the high-tech bubble in the early 2000s extinguished the reoccurrence
of federal surpluses.
That said, we believe that the question regarding the desirability of federal
surpluses remains current. As such, this paper seeks to impart essence to the
debate while stimulating reflection of how Canadian expectations might best
be forged. In the following text, we begin our discussion by presenting a brief
overview of the federal surplus and an understanding of the different surplus
components. Building on that, we then examine negative implications associated
with federal surpluses and the main causes leading to continued reappearance
of those budgetary surpluses. Finally, we conclude by highlighting the more
salient aspects of our findings and offer a practical recommendation to the
surprise surplus conundrum.
Importantly also, we should recognize that surpluses; particularly the surprise
element, should not be taken as a given. Although we have received positive
news for some eleven years, we must acknowledge that this will not always be
the case. Realistically, governments seek to achieve balance but there are
social and economic factors that are both outside of the government’s control
and difficult to predict. That said, there may and will be, years of deficit and
we shouldn’t simply plan on continuously having surprise surpluses to count
on. Many would agree therefore, that this is all the more reason to receive and
to use surprise surpluses perceptively.
Intuitively at least, it
is worth asking the
question of whether the
constantly reappearing
federal budget surpluses
are desirable in the
first place?11
In the spring 2008, the Certified General Accountants of Canada set out to
investigate current thinking around the surprise components of federal budget
surpluses. While constantly reappearing federal surpluses have become a part
of the Canada’s fiscal identity and the national pride, a closer investigation
reveals a number of disconcerting trends. These trends lead us to question the
desirability of reoccurring surprise surpluses and whether or not there are true
benefits associated with them. While this paper focuses on recent surpluses,
we should note also that at time of writing, certain signals are hinting at a
deficit scenario within the next couple of years.
While the tides may be changing, the recent history of Canada’s federal
budgetary balance is truly remarkable. After more than 25 years of chronic,
large-size budget deficits, the federal government has reported a string of 11
consecutive surpluses. None of the G7 countries can boast a similar record;
however, consecutive budget surpluses are not a unique phenomenon among
other OECD countries. Between 1992 and 2006, federal and total governments
of 13 other OECD countries reported consecutive budget surpluses.
In the Canadian context, the federal surplus often has two components. The
planned component is integrated into budget projections, whilst the surprise
component appears when the actual budgetary balance exceeds the planned
surplus. The federal government recorded 10 surprise surpluses which amounted
to a total of $85 billion over 11 surplus years.
The federal government has recognized that surprise surpluses erode the
credibility of the budget process and limit the scope for parliamentarians to
debate the uses of surpluses. Our analysis suggests that the following elements
may also be added to the list of concerns created by the reoccurring surprise
surpluses:
• Pressure to spend
The regular appearance of surprise surpluses strengthens the impression
that Canadians are over-taxed. The facts though, show that Canada may be
characterized as a low-intermediate tax country, with decreasing size of the
federal government and declining effective tax rates for both individuals
and business. As such, some attention has been redirected from the level
of taxation to the mix and structure of taxation conduits. Over the surplus
years for example, federal tax revenues have been increasingly relying on
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income taxes which are associated with high levels of economic distortion.
Conversely, the role of more economically effective consumption and
payroll taxes has been declining and is projected to follow this trend in
the future.
Another impression associated with surprise surpluses is that the government
has spare fiscal capacity to spend on various priorities. It is accurate to
concede that the mid-1990s witnessed a general shift in the views of the
role of social policy resulting in certain adjustments to government spending.
Accompanied by drastic cuts in federal spending targeted at taming the
deficit, the government, has since not had to exercise such intense fiscal
restraint. In fact, government program spending adjusted for inflation and
population growth has increased by nearly 30% since that time and was
higher, on a per capita basis, in 2007-08 than any other year in the past
24 years.
• Pro-cyclical fiscal policy
The federal fiscal policy bears some pro-cyclical features. During the
fairly strong economic growth experienced over the surplus years, federal
government program spending, as a percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP) has gone up, while a reverse trend can be observed for federal tax
revenues. Moreover, a number of tax cut measures have been implemented
during a time when the economy was already operating above its production
capacity; whereas, the substantial downward revisions of the economic
projections for 2008 and 2009 have not translated into noticeable adjustments
to budgetary revenues and spending projections.
• Year-end program spending hikes
Traditionally, a significant amount of spending has occurred in March
when year-end resources could reasonably be anticipated. During surplus
years, federal program spending tends to increase not only in March but
throughout the entire last third of the fiscal year. This makes it tempting to
assume that the availability of excessive funds such as those associated
with a surprise surplus affect the vigilance of maintaining a steady level of
budgetary and essential spending. In the absence of these year-end spending
hikes, these funds could have remained part of the surprise surpluses and
concomitantly been directed towards paying the national debt; contributing
some $30 billion more to that aim.
Knowing the negative consequences associated with surprise surpluses,
it may be useful to identify their causes. Simple logic suggests that the
surprise component of the surplus can only be caused by inaccuracy of
budgetary projections. During the surplus years, the forecasting inaccuracy
has been considered high; however, no particular tendency could be13
observed towards either increasing, or decreasing, or stabilizing the magnitude
of inaccuracy.
The actual level of the forecasting inaccuracy is masked by in-year adjustments
to policy initiatives. Our estimates reveal that the cumulative level of surprise
surpluses could have been at least $50 billion higher than reported had in-year
policy measures not been introduced. Moreover, the one year (i.e. 2004-05)
when the federal government did not report a surprise surplus would also have
revealed a surprise surplus if an in-year initiative had not been dispatched.
Taken individually and collectively, three factors are believed to nourish
the inaccuracy of budgetary projections: strong economic growth, simple
arithmetic and a no-deficit rule. A closer look at these factors leads to a
conclusion that the no-deficit determination of the government may be the
most influential among them.
There is no straightforward relationship between stronger than expected
economic growth and surprise surpluses. For instance, a lower than expected
economic growth in 2003-04 was accompanied by a substantial surprise
surplus, whereas relatively accurate economic projections in 2006-07 also
went in a tandem with an above average surprise surplus. Similarly, the growth
rate of the main economic indicators affecting budgetary revenues (e.g. gross
domestic product, household income and consumption) was not much better
during the surplus years compared to deficit ones.
And the fact that a budgetary balance is just a mathematical difference
between revenues and expenditures renders it a valid measure for all countries.
However, the analysis conducted by the International Monetary Fund concluded
that Canada’s forecasting seems to be more inaccurate than in other countries
even though Canada has a very strong institutional basis supporting the
budgeting process.
As for the no-deficit rule, some critics suggest that the federal government
no longer aims at avoiding deficit with the same explicit prudence within the
budget forecasting cycle. However, there are still certain incentives for the
government to strive for achieving surprise surpluses and their presence over
the past two years is sign of that. In April 2008, the Federal Finance Minister
reassured the Canadian people that due diligence and protection of the public
were at the top of the Conservative agenda and that a balanced budget was
consequently important. In short, all federal parties are calling for financial
prudence with the prospect of an election; but as described above, there is little
accord between how each would pursue that attribute. But more importantly,
we need recognize that the federal government uses federal surpluses to pay
down public debt. The commitment to eliminate total government’s net debt14
in less than a generation seems to be benefiting directly from the surprise
surpluses and warrants strategic consideration.
It may be however that planned surpluses can pay off the debt as effectively
as surprise surpluses but that Canadians simply don’t receive the news as
positively for fear of being deliberately over-taxed. The fact of the matter
though is that the surprise surplus methodology has simply become problematic
of late as Canadian appetite for tax cuts has swelled.
All considered, one can’t help wonder if surprise surpluses have become
strategy. As a tactic, it does have appeal and creates, over time, a norm which
permits accelerated debt retirement.
We all have to wonder if surprise surpluses (and deficits) are truly economic
irregularities.And if they really represent new found money, perhaps we need
to support the notion of becoming debt-free.15
For some young adults, experience with federal deficits may be limited to
reference of archive documents, whereas for most Canadians the deficit years
are part of a remote past. Many would agree that federal budget surpluses have
become a norm of our lives and that their more than a decade history has
rendered Canadians fairly aware of the presence and nature of the phenomenon.
And yet, we reckon it is useful to begin our discussion by setting up a uniform
stage for our further considerations. For that reason, we begin our discussion
with a brief overview of Canada’s history with budgetary balance and how we
fair in an international context. For sake of comprehension, we also deliberate
on different approaches to defining the very notion of a federal surplus.
2.1. A Historic Glance at Canada’s
Federal Budgetary Balance
The budgetary balance shows the gap between revenues and expenditures as
they are earned or incurred over the course of a given period of time. The
recent history of Canada’s federal budgetary balance is truly remarkable.
After more than 25 years of chronic, large-size budget deficits, the federal
government has consistently closed its books in the black since 1997 with
significant budget surplus.
Interest rate growth outpacing Canada’s economy and structural economic
weaknesses such as decline in productivity growth and stagnation of house-
hold disposable income are often cited as the main causes of the budget
distress in the 1970s, 1980s and through the early 1990s. In those years, budget
revenues failed to match government expenditures even despite the rising tax
rates.
1 By the mid 1990s, Canada was caught in a vicious fiscal cycle where
high deficits were pushing up interest rates which, in turn, were depressing
economic activity which led to an exacerbated fiscal situation. The interest
charges paid on the public debt had become the largest single component of
the government’s expenses and the increasing public debt was largely driven
by the rising debt servicing burden (Figure 1).
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1 Department of Finance Canada (1994). A New Framework for Economic Policy.
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books in the black since
1997 with significant
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The 1980s and the early 1990s experienced certain attempts to improve the
budgetary balance. The operating balance – the excess of revenues over
program spending – became positive during the 1987-88 fiscal year; a decade
prior to achieving budgetary surplus (Figure 2). Yet, the positive margin of
the operating balance achieved at that time was not sufficient to offset the
mounting debt service charges and was unable to withstand the negative
consequences of global recession of the early 1990s.
Balancing the federal budget became a number one priority of Budget 1995.
It aimed to “put the fiscal house in order” by striving for a smaller but smarter
government – a new vision of the government’s role in the economy.
2 This
tightening of budgetary spending was also linked to a much broader change in
the general approach to public management. One which was focused on
clarification of federal roles and responsibilities, an improved honing of
resources for high priority issues, using modern practices to service delivery,
and more affordable government.
3 These measures and favourable economic
conditions resulted in a seemingly magic disappearance of the federal deficit
and eleven consecutive years of federal budget surplus.
2 Martin, P. (1995). Budget Speech.
3 Pal, L.A. (2006). Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times, 3rd ed. Toronto:
Thomson Nelson, p. 206.








The aspiration of restoring the nation’s finances to health was focused on
moving away from temporary fiscal remissions to a consistent improvement
of the federal fiscal position. As such, the goal of overcoming the deficit was
further supplemented by a debt reduction strategy first introduced in The Debt
Repayment Plan in 1998. Initially, the strategy was focused on reducing the
absolute amount of the debt; however starting with Budget 2004, the target
was shifted towards achieving a certain level of debt-to-GDP ratio. Since its
peak in 1996-97, the federal public debt has been reduced by some $106 billion
reaching the mark of $457.1 billion at the end of 2007-08 fiscal year. As a
result, the debt-to-GDP ratio was reduced by more than twice compared to its
highest level in 1995-96 (top chart of Figure 3). The public debt charges have
declined accordingly leaving higher proportion of the federal revenues to be
spent on purposes other than servicing the debt. While in the early 1990s,
more than one third of the budgetary revenues had to be committed to servicing
the federal debt, by the end of 2007-08, only 13.5% of revenues had to be
dedicated to paying interest on the debt (bottom chart of Figure 3).
2.2. International Perspective
It is quite frequently and proudly reiterated that Canada is the only G7 country
that is currently in surplus, has a strong historic record of consecutive surpluses,
and is expected to be in surplus in the near future. Although true, comparison
with only G7 countries narrows significantly the range of countries that are
similar to Canada in terms of size, trade openness and technologic development.
Extending the comparison group to countries that are members of the OECD
may change our view of the uniqueness of the Canadian federal surplus.
Extending the international
comparison group from
G7 to countries that are
members of the OECD
may change our view of
the uniqueness of the
Canadian federal surplus18
Federal governments
4 of nine OECD countries reported budgetary surplus in
2006. This constituted one third of all OECD countries for which information
on the federal government is available. Moreover, in the past fifteen years,
14 OECD countries reported federal surplus during two or more consecutive
years (top bar chart of Figure 4). With only two exceptions, the average level
of surplus in those countries was higher than that in Canada.
4 OECD statistics is reported for four subsectors of the general government: (i) central government,
(ii) state government, (iii) local government, and (iv) social security funds. Canada’s federal government
is the Canadian equivalent of the central government used in the OECD classification. To maintain the
consistency with the rest of the report, the international comparison will be discussed using the term
“federal government” rather than “central government” commonly used by the OECD.
In the past fifteen years,
14 OECD countries
reported federal surplus
during two or more
consecutive years19
Certain differences may exist in the financial responsibilities among different
levels of government. Due to this, the international comparison is often based
not so much on analysing the financial performance of one of the levels of
the government (e.g. federal government), but on considering the so-called
“general government” encompassing the variety of public sectors in the economy.
For Canada, general government includes the federal, provincial-territorial
and local government sectors, as well as the Canada Pension Plan and the
Quebec Pension Plan.20
General governments of 16 OECD countries registered surpluses in two or
more consecutive years between 1992 and 2006 (bottom bar chart of Figure
4). For some of them (e.g. Korea, Norway, Luxembourg and New Zealand),
the surplus was persisting for more than a decade. The performance of
Canada’s general government was somewhat less remarkable than that of the
federal government with only 8 years of surplus to boast of. Overall, the 1990s
where the years when a broad range of countries underwent various degrees
of fiscal consolidation, and about 18 industrialized countries balanced their
budgets during approximately the same time as Canada.
5
The cavities of the international comparison lie not only within the range of
countries used as a benchmark, but also within the fact that the accounting
framework used for the international comparison is different from the one in
which budgetary numbers are reported to Canadian Parliament and thus most
known to the Canadian general public.
Budget documents prepared for Parliament are based on the Public Accounts
accounting framework – an accounting standard set by Canadian regulatory
bodies. This framework focuses on the financial activities of the government
and provides a snapshot of the government’s finances at a given point in time.
Its international counterpart, in turn, is usually based on the system of the
National Accounts which allows mitigating the differences in the accounting
frameworks used in different countries. Unlike the Public Accounts, the
National Accounts are focused on economic activities of the government and
based on the international accounting conventions set out by the United
Nations. The National Accounts look at the production and income side of
governmentoperationsandreflectsamuchbroaderdefinitionofthegovernment
than do the Public Accounts.
Budget deficits calculated on the National Accounts basis are usually lower
than those computed using the Public Accounts basis as the latter does not
include the net amount of the federal government’s employee’s pension
funds.
6 In some cases, this may mean that a budget position reported as a
surplus based on the country’s internal reporting system is reported as a deficit
based on the international accounting conventions. Identifying specific
examples of such cases would go beyond the scope of this study; however, this
provides a useful reminder that Canada’s international lead-runner position in
terms of budgetary balance is a subjective matter.
5 Stanford, J. (2003). Paul Martin, the Deficit, and the Debt: Taking Another Look, Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives, Alternative Federal Budget 2004, Technical Paper #1.
6 Department of Finance Canada (1996). The Economic and Fiscal Update.
For some of the OECD
countries, the surplus
was persisting for more
than a decade21
And although the international perspective provides an interesting peek into
other countries’fiscal affairs, our interests lie first and foremost with Canada.
Consequently, the balance of our discussion will be focused on the budgetary
surplus of Canada’s federal government.
2.3. Planned vs. Surprise Surpluses
Over the past decade, the term “budget surplus” has been routinely used in the
media, analytical publications and government documents. The Department of
Finance Canada defines surplus as “the amount by which government revenue
exceeds budgetary spending in any given year”,
7 while most publications
coming from other sources than the government do not provide a specific
definition and use the term “surplus” as a self-defined concept. While we
agree with the general definition used by the Department of Finance Canada,
the current structure of the federal budget implies certain duality of the
surplus. As you will have noted for the purpose of this report, the two
components of the federal surplus are considered to be the planned surplus
and the surprise surplus.
The planned federal surplus is integrated in the projections presented in the
federal budget each year and can be calculated as the difference between
budgetary revenues and the sum of program spending and public debt charges.
Once the first surplus was reported in 1997, successive federal budgets have
continued to include planned surplus; however the language used to define
them has changed several times over the years. In the late 1990s, planned
surplus was called “underlying balance”; in the early 2000s it was renamed to
“underlying budgetary surplus”; and, starting in 2006 it became a combination
of “planned debt reduction” and “remaining surplus”.
Surprise federal surplus occurs when the actual budgetary balance exceeds the
planned surplus. The federal government recorded 10 surprise surpluses over
the past 11 years. They averaged $8.6 billion a year and summed to a noticeable
$85 billion at the end of 2007-08 fiscal year. In relative terms, the level of
surprise surpluses is also remarkable: it reached as high as 11.6% of actual
budgetary revenues in 1997-98 and averaged at 4.6% during the surplus years
(Figure 5).
7 Glossary, Department of Finance Canada, available at: http://www.fin.gc.ca/gloss/gloss-s_e.html#Surplus,
accessed on April 12, 2008.
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The timeframe is also important when speaking about federal budgetary
surpluses. Federal surpluses may be examined by looking into the past years
for which the levels of projected and actual surpluses are already known and
their use has already taken place. A forward looking approach may also be
applied as the budget documents and fiscal updates include projections of the
underlying surplus for several years ahead. These projections are usually
presented in two forms. First is a status quo fiscal outlook which shows
expected budgetary components given the current economic conditions.
Second is a fiscal outlook that includes policy measures introduced since the
last budget or fiscal update. Past experience shows that new policy measures
often “consume” most of the surpluses present in the status quo projections.
In that way, the surpluses may be considered as “spent” on the new policy
initiatives and thus transformed into budgetary revenues and/or expenses. For
the purpose of this paper, we focus our discussion on the federal surpluses
which have already occurred as only those may be truly and surely referred to,
or relied upon, as budgetary surpluses.
The purpose of the planned component of the surplus has been fairly straight-
forward; however, changing over time. Through the 1997-2005 periods,
planned surpluses were used to form the Contingency Reserve and the
Economic Prudence reserve (the latter was first introduced in Budget 2000).
The purpose of these reserves was to protect the fiscal targets against unforeseen
developments and economic uncertainty. If the contingency reserve was
ultimately excessive, it was redirected to debt retirement while the economic
prudence was directed to fund government priorities. Commencing in Budget
The purpose of the
planned component of




2006, planned surpluses are principally assigned towards planned debt
reduction; however, the possible use of planned surplus in excess of the
portion assigned towards debt repayment (the so-called “remaining surplus”)
is ambiguous.
The possible use of surprise surpluses has been less obvious. The Unanticipated
Surpluses Act introduced into the Parliament in 2005 sought to bring some
clarity to the issue but has not been passed into a law. Budget 2006 suggested
examining the possibility of allocating a portion of surplus to the Canada
Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan. The wording used in Budget 2007
was more specific and targeted to use surprise surpluses for debt reduction;
however, this wording is not repeated in Budget 2008.
One should keep in mind, though, that the level of surplus may be affected not
only by the difference between budgetary revenues and expenditures but also
by the accounting rules used to prepare government financial statements. The
1997-98 fiscal year provides a good example. The change in methods of
accounting for assistance to international financial institutions introduced in
1997 reduced the 1997-98 surplus by $1.8 billion, whereas changes in the
method used to calculate interest costs on obligations for public sector
pensions affected the 1997-98 surplus in the opposite direction increasing it
by $2.5 billion.
8 In so doing, under the initial accounting rules, the federal
surplus would have been reported as $2.4 billion, while accounting changes
introduced in 1997 pushed the dollar amount of the surplus up to $3.1 billion.
Accounting and reporting changes introduced during the surplus years also
created certain challenges for composing a historic data set reflecting the
dollar amounts of the budgetary components. Appendix I provides more
details on the technical challenges encountered when comparing historic data
presented in the government financial statements.
As seen from the discussion above, Canada has achieved a truly remarkable
turnaround in its federal fiscal balance. Fully appreciative of this achievement,
it is important to remember that Canada’s surplus is not a unique phenomenon
amongst industrialized countries; and it is not judicious to interpret it as an
unequivocal indicator of Canada’s performance relative to the international
environment. Different countries apply different approaches and set different
goals for their fiscal policies. In this regard, we believe that a critical review,
rather than a soothing satisfaction is due regarding the federal surpluses,
particularly the continuously reappearing surprise components of the federal
surplus. The pages that follow intend to do that.
8 Receiver General for Canada (1997). Public Accounts of Canada 1997, Volume I – Summary Report
and Financial Statements.
The possible use of
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Year after year, a large number of industrialized and developing countries
struggle to reduce their deficits and to bring their public finances in line.
One may confidently assume that many of those countries would wish to
have at least a fraction of Canada’s success in balancing the federal budget
and achieving consecutive surpluses. And yet, we dare to say that there are
negative implications of budget surpluses, particularly when they are not
explicitly planned.
As the federal government itself admitted in 2006, the continued reappearance
of larger than expected surpluses has eroded the credibility of the budget
process and limited the scope for parliamentarians to debate the uses of funds.
9
Such other concerns as pressure to spend the excessive fiscal room, pro-cyclical
nature of fiscal policy and eroded vigilance of maintaining a steady level of
spending may also be added to the list of negative implications triggered by
surprise surpluses. The paragraphs that follow consider these implications in
more detail.
3.1. Pressure to Spend
The regular appearance of surprise surpluses creates an impression that excessive
fiscal capacity exists and serves to ignite a debate on how to spend those
funds. The major clash happens when we attempt to reconcile opposing
views between those who believe that Canadians are over-taxed and thus that
a major tax reduction is due, and those who believe that the spending role of
the government has been eroded and thus higher spending on new or expanded
federal programs should be sanctioned.And even if we accept these arguments
at face value, there is still the question of whether the impressions of over-
taxation and under-spending are as accurate as they seem to be.
3.1.1. Over-taxation
At least perceptually, reoccurring budget surpluses may resemble a form of
over-taxation. Indeed, it is quite natural to assume that if the government
collects more money than it plans to spend, the revenue collection tools
(i.e. taxes) are set at a level higher than necessary. The persistence with which
calls for lower taxes are made also serves as an indicator of our perception of
being over-taxed. For instance, a number of prominent interest groups still
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9 Department of Finance Canada (2006). The Budget Plan, p. 53.
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expressed their disappointment with the absence of tax reduction measures
offered by Budget 2008
10 although this was only few months after the
government announced a fairly substantial tax cut package in October 2007.
Over-taxation is a complex notion to judge and depends on the unit of analysis
selected to analyse the economy as a whole, or particular economic agents
such as individuals and businesses. It may also differ depending on whether
we look at the overall tax burden imposed on the economic agent or the
burden levied by a particular tax regime. Canada’s multiple levels of taxation
– federal, provincial and municipal – further add to the complexity of the
issue. Choosing the benchmark for assessing over-taxation is equally intricate;
for example, are we over-taxed compared to the level of taxes of some thirty
years ago, or compared to today’s situation in other countries, or relative to the
services Canadians can expect to enjoy?
Acknowledging these complexities, we focus our discussions on only two
of the aspects of taxation which have a direct relevance to the fiscal policy
and surprise surpluses: (i) proportion of revenue collected through taxes, and
(ii) mix of taxes used to collect revenue.
Level of tax revenue
The level of budgetary revenue collected through taxes determines, to a great
extend, the size of the government and the value of goods and services that a
country chooses to provide on a collective basis. Considering the notion of
over-taxation through a prism of the government’s size leads to a broader
political economy debate regarding the values citizens attach to those public
goods. Although contributing to this type of a debate would go beyond the
scope of this report, several facts are deemed to be most interesting.
First, a recent study conducted by the Canadian Centre for PolicyAlternatives
(CCPA) ranked 21 industrialized countries in terms of the level of their taxes.
11
Based upon the commonly relied on average annual tax revenue-to-GDP
ratio, the countries were assigned one of four categorizations: low-tax,
low-intermediate tax, high-intermediate tax and high-tax countries. Surprising
to some, Canada was ranked as a low-intermediate tax country and was only
eight countries from being the one having the smallest tax burden relying on
the methodology employed by the CCPA. While we note that other models of
evaluation might dampen this outcome, particularly those which isolate the
10 See, for instance, Canadian Chamber of Commerce (2008), Budget Does Not Go Far Enough on Tax
Relief, News Release, February 26, 2008; Canadian Federation of Independent Business (2008),
National Legislative Action – Budget Reaction; Canadian Taxpayers Federation (2008), A New Tax
Savings Plan & Modest Spending Growth, News Release, February 26, 2008.
11 Brooks, N. and Hwong, T. (2006). The Social Benefits and Economic Costs of Taxation: A Comparison
of High- and Low-Tax Countries, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. The following countries were
considered by the study: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States.
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alternate conduits of taxation or their basis of computation, the principle point
is that ‘the whole’ of Canada should not typically be viewed as a peculiarly
high tax nation.
Second, the size of Canada’s federal government has been decreasing over the
surplus years. While tax revenues of the federal government accounted for
16.8% of GDP in 1997-08 fiscal year, this proportion went down to 14.5% in
2007-08 and is projected to reach as low as 13.9% in 2009-10.
12
Third, effective tax rates
13 of households and businesses have been declining
over the past years as well. As seen from Figure 6, the personal income tax
burden – the largest and most obvious tax burden borne by Canadians,
decreased from 17.9% in 1999 to 16.5% in 2005. The decreasing effective
federal tax rate made its own contribution to this. The tax burden levied on
businesses showed a declining trend as well. The average effective federal
tax rate levied on all industry went down to 14.6% in 2006 from as high as
17.7% in 2000.
Type of taxes used
The type of tax used for collecting tax revenues affects greatly the degree of
distortion and the level of the redistributive effect the government brings to the
economy. For instance, capital-based taxes decrease incentives to save and
invest, whereas consumption taxes are known to reduce incentives to work.
Although Canada has made some progress in improving its tax system,
Canada’s mix of taxes remains heavily criticized.
As was discussed in a recent CGA-Canada brief,
14 the existing body of
research identifies and rationalizes a distinction between “good taxes” and
“bad taxes”. The general rule suggests that good taxes are associated with
relatively low costs to society and high economic efficiency in allocating
human and capital resources.A number of economic models testing empirical
data for different countries came to similar conclusions regarding the economic
efficiency of different types of taxes. The results of these models produce the
following ranking of taxes in terms of their economic efficiency (from
higher to lower efficiency): (1) consumption taxes, (2) payroll taxes, (3)
personal income taxes, (4) corporate income taxes, (5) sales taxes on capital
goods, and (6) personal capital income taxes.
15
12 Based on Fiscal Reference Tables 2007, The Budget Plan 2008, Department of Finance Canada.
13 The effective tax rate for persons is defined as a ratio of total income tax paid to total income assessed
in all tax returns. The effective tax rate for industry is defined as a ratio of total amount of taxes paid by
all industries to total profit before income tax.
14 CGA-Canada (2008). Issue in Focus – Is Cutting the GST the Best Approach?
Available at www.cga.org/canada
15 Baylor, M. (2005). Ranking Tax Distortions in Dynamic General Equilibrium Models: A Survey,
Department of Finance Canada, Working Paper 2005-06.
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The tax composition of the federal revenue favours greatly the fairly distortive
personal income tax which accounted for half of the all taxes collected by the
federal government in 2007-08 (Figure 7). More important, though, is the
dynamic of the tax revenue structure overtime. Despite a number of tax
reducing initiatives, the proportion of fairly distortive income taxes (both
personal and corporate) has slightly increased over the surplus years, while the
proportion of consumption and payroll taxes – those which are associated
with high economic efficiency – decreased. Furthermore, the two-year fiscal
projections presented in Budget 2008 suggest that reliance on personal income
taxes will further increase while the share of consumption taxes in the federal
tax revenue will continue to decline. This sharply contrasts with the general
tendency observed in other OECD countries whose consumption taxes play an
increasingly more important role.
16 What is more is that domestic public
criticism may be on the rise for having reduced taxes; especially the goods and
services tax (GST).
Putting the facts and trends described above in the perspective of surprise
federal surpluses may suggest that it is not so much the overall level of the tax
burden that should be of a concern, but rather the mix of available tax avenues.
A lower amount of tax revenue collected using highly distortive taxes is less
likely to lead to improved living standards when compared to higher revenue
collected through efficient taxes.
16 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004). Recent Tax Policy Trends and
Reforms in OECD Countries, OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 9.
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The notion of under-spending is not as widespread as the expressed views
relating to the alleged excessive tax burden; however, should not be ignored.
Two noticeable shifts in public policy are worth noting when considering the
issue of under-spending.
First is the representation of the general shift in the paradigm that defines the
social policy. It is the shift from the social security programs designed to
protect individuals from different types of economic disruptions to programs
focusing on investing in developing and improving peoples’ knowledge
and skills that would allow individuals to cope effectively with economic
transitions. However, some experts believe that the reduction in the income
protection was much more abrupt than the increase in funding for education
and training, leading, thus, to a decreased economic security.
17
Second is the magnitude of fiscal restraint exercised to combat the budget
deficit. Total program spending, which is one of the major policy instruments
of the federal government, went down dramatically in the mid 1990s. It
accounted for $122.2 billion in 1992-93 but decreased by some 14% in real
terms by the end of 1996-97.
18 A similar trend was observed in program
spending as a share of GDP. This drop was largely achieved by changes in the
unemployment insurance system, cuts in health and social transfers to the
provinces, and reduced compensation of public employees.
These policy shifts and constantly reappearing surprise surpluses create strong
preconditions for some stakeholders to advocate for increased government
spending that would rebuild to the government’s spending capacity enjoyed
in past decades. It should be noted, though, that government spending adjusted
for inflation and population growth has been increasing over the surplus years
and by 2007-08 has already surpassed its historic peak of 1983-84 (Figure 8).
It grew at an average annual rate of 2.5% between 1997-98 and 2007-08
while accelerating to 4% growth in 2006-07 and 2007-08 fiscal years. One has
to wonder if it is sustainable to continue with such increases; leave aside a
premeditated acceleration of federal program spending.
It would be interesting to observe how the tone of advocacy for tax cuts
and spending increases might behave in the absence of the surprise federal
surpluses. Hardly any empirical simulation or statistical analysis may shed
light on this, and answering this question would definitely be speculative.
Our bet is that the calls for reform would be fewer and the concern over
government’s financial distress greater. But, why would that be so if the surprise
surplus is not even supposed to be there in the first place?
17 Green, D.A. and Kesselman, J.R. (2006). Dimensions of Inequality in Canada, UBC Press, p. 418-445.
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3.2. Pro-cyclical Nature of Fiscal Policy
Economic theory suggests that fiscal policy should strive to be counter-cyclical.
This would mean that during the economic boom, total government spending
as a share of GDP should go down, whereas government revenues as a share
of GDP should go up. These fluctuations are triggered by so-called automatic
stabilizers (e.g. variation in personal income tax revenues and Employment
Insurance expenditures) which, in turn, are driven by the intensity of the
economic activity.
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy, in turn, has the opposite characteristics: during
economic booms government spending as a share of GDP goes up while tax
rates go down. Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is deemed to be sub-optimal and adds
to macroeconomic instability as it may require adjustments that exacerbate
economic weakness during economic downturns and prevent functioning of
automatic stabilizers. Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is typical for developing
countries whereas industrialized countries such as OECD countries generally
have counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
19
Although Canada can hardly be considered as a developing nation, the
budgetary characteristics of the federal government bear some pro-cyclical
features. As seen from the bottom chart of Figure 9, the Canadian economy
19 Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (2006). Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?, Institute for Economic






experienced a fairly strong economic growth over the surplus years with only
few small exceptions in the early 2000s. Despite that, federal government
program spending as percentage of GDP went up reaching 13% in 2007-08
from its lowest of 11.8% in 1999-00. A reverse trend was observed for federal
tax revenues which may be considered as a national tax rate when measured
as a proportion of GDP. Over the surplus years, revenue-to-GDP ratio declined
from 16.6% in 1997-98 to 14.4% in 2007-08 (top chart of Figure 9).
Despite a fairly strong
economic growth
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The increasing government spending and decreasing budgetary revenues
shown in Figure 9 came as an additional stimulus to the economy which was
already exhibiting strong growth. For instance, the 2000 Five-Year Tax
Reduction Plan was announced in the year when the economy was already
operating above its full capacity
20 – an indicator that suggests a presence of an
excessive demand in the economy. Similarly, the Canada’s Tax Fairness Plan
announced in 2006 added in that year some $14 billion to the economy
operating above its full capacity.
21
A somewhat opposite trend was observed in Budget 2008. The turbulence on
the financial markets that broke out in the summer 2007 caused the economic
projections to be revised down for 2008-09 and 2009-10 fiscal years. At the
time of writing this paper, two downward revisions have been made since
Budget 2007 – the latest budget forecast made prior to the economic slowdown.
The projections were revised in the Economic Statement 2007 and then in
Budget 2008. Table 1 provides a summary of the revisions.
As seen from Table 1, the revisions to the economic growth for 2008 and 2009
were fairly substantial. However, this translated into only minor adjustments
to the expected levels of budgetary revenues and expenses. For fairness sake,
it should be mentioned that the tax reduction package announced in October
2007 was a timely supportive measure for the economic downturn unfolding
since summer 2007. However, it remains questionable if these measures were
triggered by the anticipation of the difficult economic times or for other reasons.
Among the different instruments that government can use to influence the
economy, the interest rate set by the central bank is considered to be a most
responsive and timely government intervention.The first policy measure taken
by the Bank of Canada in response to the economic downturn was in December
2007, already after the government’s announcement of the tax measures.











































20 Bank of Canada (2006). Monetary Policy Report, October 2006 (Chart 4)
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3.3. Year-end Program Spending Hikes
Traditionally, a significant amount of annual spending has occurred in March.
22
However, during surplus years, federal program spending tended to increase
not only in March but also throughout the entire last third of the fiscal year.
This makes it tempting to hypothesize that the availability of excessive funds,
such as those associated with a surprise surplus erodes vigilance in maintaining
steady levels of budgetary spending.
Taking as a basis the data on monthly budgetary expenses published by The
Fiscal Monitor, we examined the level of budgetary spending throughout the
year for all surplus years. Our estimates show that average federal program
spending occurring in the last third of the fiscal year (i.e. December – March)
has constantly been higher than average spending experienced during either of
the other 4 month periods of the year (i.e. April – November). This holds true
even when March is excluded from the consideration as an atypical month in
which spending is expected to be significantly higher.
During the first five surplus years, the average program spending that took
place in December – February was more than 10% higher than the average
spending forApril – November. Starting with the 2002-03 fiscal year, the level
of year-end hikes became less pronounced; however, it bounced back to as
high as 11.3% in 2007-08 (top bar chart of Figure 10).
In the absence of the year-end spending hikes, the funds otherwise spent could
have become part of the surprise surplus. The bottom bar chart of Figure 10
shows the dollar amount of the estimated impact of the end-year increase in
spending. Keeping December – February program spending at the same level
as in the first eight months of the fiscal year could, for instance, have added as
much as $5.3 billion to the federal surplus in 2001-02 and another $5.3 billion
in 2007-08, but that was already relatively unpopular at the time. Prompted by
a demonstrated need, the preservation of funding allotments, or reinvestment
of surplus funds, the point of the matter is that spikes in year-end spending
are common; and do introduce some havoc in meaningfully evaluating or
comparing spending.
Reducing public debt has become one of the fiscal priorities of the federal
government. Starting from Budget 2004, the government set a numeric target
of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio to 25% and surprise surpluses have been
routinely used for paying down the debt. If year-end spending hikes, instead
of being spent, would be directed towards paying the national debt, they could
have contributed some $30 billion to that end over the last decade. In fact, the
targeted 25% debt-to-GDP ratio could have been achieved much sooner than
22 Department of Finance Canada (2006). Annual Financial Report of the Government of Canada,
Fiscal Year 2005-2006, p. 21.
If year-end program
spending hikes, instead
of being spent, would
be directed towards
paying the national
debt, they could have
contributed some $30
billion to that end over
the last decade35
the currently projected 2011-12. Figure 11 reveals the estimated would-be
debt-to-GDP ratio which could have been achieved if the year-end spending
hikes had been permitted to flow through as surprise surpluses.36
As this section has confirmed, there are a number of negative implications
associated with the surprise federal surpluses. Their very presence compels us
to investigate the factors that cause surprise surpluses to occur or to reappear.
For that reason, the following section is devoted to doing just that.
23 The would-be debt-to-GDP ratio shown on Figure 11 assumes that the annual debt reduction is composed
from the potential federal surplus and savings on public debt charges. The potential federal surplus in a
given year is estimated as a sum of the actual federal surplus and amounts of year-end hikes (i.e. excess
of average program spending in December – February over the average program spending in April –
November). Savings on public debt charges are estimated as a difference between actual public debt
charges and the would-be debt charges which are a function of the would-be debt from the previous
year. The would-be debt charges are estimated based on the interest rate paid on the actual public debt.37
When speaking of the causes of federal surpluses, the distinction between the
planned and the surprise constituents of surpluses becomes useful and central.
For the planned component of the surplus, the answer to the question of
causality is more than straightforward. The planned surplus is caused by a
clear and open determination of the government to simply have it, which is
also reflected in the term “planned”.
For the surprise component of the surplus, the variety of causes that come to
mind may vary from pure good fortune to favourable economic developments,
to political will, to electorate pressure. However, one should be mindful of
pitfalls of cause-effect relationship: the cause of a surprise surplus is always
the same – inaccuracy of budget projections, whereas the causes of inaccurate
projections may be diverse and changing over time. The pages to follow
discuss these issues in greater length.
4.1. Inaccuracy of Federal Fiscal Projections
4.1.1. Budgetary Revenues and Expenses
When a surplus is not planned but comes as a surprise, it can only be caused
by inaccuracy of budgetary assumptions or projections. Surprise surpluses
appear when actual budgetary revenues and/or spending deviate from amounts
projected in the budget.Although it may be tempting to assume that a surprise
surplus would appear when the actual revenue exceeds the projected amount
or when the actual spending falls short of projections, a simultaneous excess
(or shortfall) in both revenue and spending may also result in a surprise
surplus if the excesses/shortfalls are of a different magnitude.
During the surplus years, actual budgetary revenues have always exceeded
projected amounts. This was the case even in 2004-05 when no surprise
surplus was recorded. However, the level of excess varied significantly over
the years with no particular trend or constant towards, an increase, a decrease,
or stabilization in the magnitude of the forecasting inaccuracy. Forecasting
mistakes varied from nearly 11% of projected revenues in 2000-01 to less than
1% of the projected level in 2003-04 and to approximately 3% in 2007-08
(Figure 12).
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Analogous to the budgetary revenues, the inaccuracy of spending projections
does not show any particular trend over the surplus years. However, the
inaccuracy of spending projections was positive in some years and negative in
others, and the magnitude of error was somewhat lower than that for the
revenue projections. Six out of 10 years of surprise surpluses saw actual
spending fall short of projected levels (Figure 12). The shortfall was particularly
noticeable in the 2001-02 fiscal year when actual federal spending fell short
by 3.1% of the projected amounts. This was so despite the unfavourable
economic conditions caused by the September 11 events and the capital market
turbulences triggered by the Dot-com bubble burst in 2000. During the four
years when actual budgetary spending exceeded the projected amounts, the
level of excess differed significantly. The error was 3.2% of projected spending
in 1998-99, exceeded 6% in 2005-06, and was only 0.4% in 2007-08.
Such inconsistency in the forecasting inaccuracy does not allow for any
conclusive certainty as to whether surprise surpluses were caused by excessive
revenues or limited spending. For instance, in 2001-02, the surprise surplus
wasmainlycausedbylowerthanexpectedbudgetaryspendingwhilein2006-07,
it appeared primarily due to higher than expected budgetary revenues.
Moreover, during the surplus years, the federal government often introduced
additional spending or tax measures as the fiscal year was unfolding. These
in-year measures were not envisioned at the time of preparing the revenue and
spending projections and thus were not reflected in the budget forecasts.
Inconsistency in the
forecasting inaccuracy






Among the most noticeable examples of such measures is the broad-based tax
relief announced by the government in October 2007 and an increase in health
care transfer payments made to provinces announced in fall 2004.
Such in-year adjustments mask the actual magnitude of the inaccuracy of
the budgetary projections. For instance, unplanned tax reduction during
the fiscal year will diminish the actual revenue for that year and may
increase or decrease the inaccuracy of the revenue projections. Similar,
launching unanticipated spending initiatives during the fiscal year may
affect the difference between the actual and projected spending. When
in-year policy measures are taken into account, the inaccuracy of budget
projections becomes even more pronounced (Figure 13).
The changes to budget revenue and spending brought by unplanned in-year
initiatives affect the level of the federal surplus and its surprise component.
Our estimates show that cumulative surprise surpluses could have aggregated
to at least $50 billion more than reported had no in-year policy measures been
implemented. Moreover, the only one year when the federal government did
not report a surprise surplus (i.e. 2004-05) would also have turned into a
surprise surplus if the government did not increase spending in an unplanned
manner over the course of that year (Figure 14).
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The in-year initiatives have been diverse in terms of policy focus, monetary
size, and their impact on the budget; and judging their quality is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, it is worth mentioning that the launch of these
initiatives was often prompted by the anticipation of surprise surpluses. This
renders the implementation of these important policy initiatives dependent on
the anticipated existence and magnitude of surprise surpluses which, again
...... are theoretically not even supposed to appear.
4.1.2. Components of Budgetary Revenues and Expenses
As evidenced above, the magnitude of forecasting inaccuracy for budgetary
revenue and spending fluctuates significantly from one year to another. The
degree to which different revenue and spending components contributed to
overall forecasting inaccuracy is also not constant. For instance, actual
revenues from personal income taxes often exceeded the projected amounts;
however, to very different extents. The excess fluctuated from nearly 10% of
the projected amounts in 2000-01 and 2005-06 to just 1% in 2006-07.
Revenues from corporate taxes saw an even higher range of forecasting
inaccuracy. They exceed the projected levels by 39% in 1997-98 fiscal year
but only by 1.8% in 2001-02. The inaccuracy in projecting revenues from
excisetaxesandemploymentinsurancepremiumshasbeenofalessermagnitude
than that for income taxes; however, have also been very inconsistent (top bar
chart of Figure 15).






On the spending side of the federal budget equation, elderly benefits were the
only item with fairly consistent forecasting accuracy over the surplus years. The
inaccuracy of projecting other spending items was much higher. Employment
insurance benefits and debt charges almost always fell short of projected
amounts reflecting favourable economic conditions and decreasing interest
rates.The forecasting accuracy of major transfers to other levels of governments
seemed to be the most volatile spending item. The actual transfers to other levels
of governments exceeded projections by some 31% in 1998-99 and 37%
in 2004-05 fiscal years. At the same time, they fell short by more than 5% of
projections in both 2001-02 and 2003-04 (bottom bar chart of Figure 15).42
It should be noted though that the spending items discussed above represent
only half of the total budgetary spending and thus do not portray the full
picture of the forecasting accuracy. One of the main obstacles to a more
thorough analysis lies in the fact that the reporting format of actual budgetary
spending differs from the format in which projections are presented. For
instance, all but one of the federal budgets tabled between 1997-98 and 2007-08
included projections for the direct program spending which accounted for
nearly half of the total program spending. However, this item is not specified
in the Fiscal Reference Tables or PublicAccounts of Canada – the two principal
publications that provide detailed information on the actual dollar amounts
associated with financial activities of the federal government.
Moreover, the analytical challenges described in Appendix I cause further
hesitation to reach a clear conclusion regarding the budgetary components that
are the most challenging for the federal government to forecast. What is clear
though is that the overall forecasting accuracy has been and remains far from
being precise.
4.2. Factors Nourishing Inaccurate Budget Projections
The federal government has examined the issue of its fiscal forecasting on a
number of occasions. In 1994, the Department of Finance Canada commissioned
an independent, external review of the Department’s forecasting performance.
A similar review was also conducted in 2005 whereas the documents
accompanying Budget 2006 also included a brief narrative of the concerns
posed by reappearing surprise surpluses.
Of these studies, the review conducted in 2005
24 contains a convincing
arrangement of veracity and breadth of the analysis. The review was prompted
by the persistent differences between the budget fiscal projections, and the
final outcomes, and aimed to identify changes to the budget process that could
improve forecast accuracy. Some 20 experts in forecasting and budget
preparation were interviewed during the study. They represented private
sector and university economists, other academics, staff advisors to political
parties and former senior government officials. A quantitative analysis of
forecast accuracy was carried out by an independent organization, while the
International Monetary Fund contributed with a comparative analysis of the
budgeting practices in Canada and other major industrialized countries.
The following factors were identified by the study as primary causes of
inaccurate budget projections:
• “Several years in which economy grew larger than expected;”








• “Small misses in forecasting revenue and spending can produce big errors
in forecasting the surplus;”
• “Cautious fiscal forecasting that flowed directly from the government’s
determination never to run a deficit.”
25
The paragraphs that follow consider these factors in greater detail.
4.2.1. A Strong Economy?
As a general rule of thumb, a stronger than anticipated economic growth is
expected to increase budgetary revenues through higher income and labour
taxesanddecreasebudgetaryspendingthroughareducedneedforunemployment
benefits creating, thus, the conditions for a surprise surplus. Over the surplus
years, the actual economic growth (measured in terms of real GDP) indeed
often exceeded the projected amounts that were used for budget forecasting.
However, there was no straightforward relationship between the stronger than
expected economic growth and surprise surpluses.
The 1999-00 fiscal year saw a large positive error in the economic forecast;
however, the surprise surplus was just about the average. In 2003-04, a lower
than expected economic growth was accompanied by a substantial surprise
surplus, whereas relatively accurate projections of the real GDP growth in
2006-07 went in a tandem with an above average surprise surplus (Figure 16).
Although the accuracy of economic forecasts has improved significantly over
the past four years, it was not reflected in a similar improvement in the accuracy
of budgetary forecasting.
25 O’Neill, T. (2005). Review of Canadian Federal Fiscal Forecasting: Processes and Systems,
O’Neill Strategic Economics, p. 24, p. 3 and p. 2 respectively






In addition to the influence of stronger-than-expected economic growth, the
federal surplus is often assumed to be a by-product of the generally strong
economy that Canada has enjoyed in recent years.
26 The fact that budgetary
revenues have always been under-estimated
27 may suggest that the elements
feeding into the revenues (e.g. household income and consumption, corporate
profit, etc.) enjoyed a particularly strong growth over the surplus years.
It is interesting to note, though, that the performance of economic indicators
that reflect the sources of budgetary revenues was not significantly better
during the surplus years compared to the years with the federal budget deficit.
For instance, the average annual growth of real GDP was only somewhat
higher during the surplus years, while household income grew at a slower pace
during the surplus years compared to the years with budget deficit (Figure 17).
For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that surplus years saw corporate
profits growing twice faster than during the deficit times; however, on average,
corporate income tax contributed only 14% to the total federal government
revenues during deficit as well as surplus years.
28
26 See, for instance, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006). OECD
Economic Surveys – Canada, Volume 2006 Issue 10; Yalnizyan, A. (2004), Squandering Canada’s
Surplus: Opting for Debt Reduction and “Scarcity by Design”, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives;
Offman, C. (2007). Surplus Passes Projection by More Than 50%, The National Post, September 28, 2007.
27 See Section 4.1.1 for more discussion regarding the forecasting accuracy of budgetary revenues
28 Department of Finance Canada. Fiscal Reference Tables, 2002 and 2007, CGA-Canada computation
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4.2.2. Small Misses?
It is difficult to argue against the fact that simple arithmetic inflicts a significant
influence on the level of the budgetary balance.
29 Derived as a difference
between two numbers measured in billions of dollars, the budgetary balance
may easily turn from surplus to deficit due to a small mistake in forecasting
one of the budgetary components.
Figure 18 shows estimated level of budgetary balance assuming that budgetary
revenue and program spending were slightly off compared to their actual
amounts. We define “favourable changes” as a simultaneous 1% increase
in budgetary revenues and 1% decreases in program spending, whereas
“unfavourable changes” represent an opposite change – a simultaneous 1%
decrease in budgetary revenues and 1% increase in program spending.
If favourable changes in the budgetary components had occurred in 1998-99,
they would have almost doubled the surplus reported in that year. Conversely,
if unfavourable changes had taken place in 2004-05, the budget would have
reported a deficit of some $2 billion (Figure 18). Also, as total amounts of
budgetary revenues and spending increases in dollar terms, the influence of
either favourable or unfavourable changes on the budgetary components
becomes more noticeable. For instance, in 1997-08, favourable changes would
29 O’Neill, T. (2005). Review of Canadian Federal Fiscal Forecasting: Processes and Systems, O’Neill
Strategic Economics.
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increase the surplus by $2.6 billion while, in 2007-08 the same magnitude of
favourable changes (i.e. 1% increase in revenues and 1% decrease in program
spending) would increase the surplus by $4.5 billion.
It may be reasonable to assume that many other countries face a similar
problem when small misses in revenue and spending forecasts result in much
larger errors in the budgetary balance. However, Canada’s forecasting seems
to be more inaccurate than in other countries.A recent study conducted by the
International Monetary Fund
30 compared accuracy of budget forecasting of
12 countries
31 and concluded that fiscal forecast errors are higher in Canada
than in the benchmark countries. This is so even despite the fact that Canada’s
fiscal forecasting is “governed by one of the strongest institutional frameworks
relative to benchmark countries.”
32
4.2.3. Fiscal Rules?
Fiscal rules are deemed to be successful in maintaining fiscal discipline as
they are designed to keep certain budgetary indicators within set limits or
levels.
33 Different countries apply different rules. For instance, the European
Union requires that deficit and debt of each member country do not exceed
specified proportions of GDP, Australia sets to have a balanced budget over
the economic cycle, whereas the United States uses caps on discretionary
spending. Generally, those fiscal rules that combine budget balance rules and
expenditure rules are found to be more effective than those referring to only
the general budget balance. A very broad formula for a successful fiscal rule
is to be flexible enough to respond to the economic cycle but also be simple
and transparent enough for managing, understanding and monitoring.
34
Over the surplus years, Canada’s fiscal rules have changed a number of times.
Budget 1998 aimed to achieve the balanced budget over a two year horizon
and a permanent, downward track of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In 1999, this
fiscal target was replaced by a “balanced budget or better”, whereas Budget
2004 added a specific numeric target for the debt-to-GDP ratio. It set to reduce
the debt level to 25% of GDP by 2014-15. In 2006, the target for the balanced
budget was silently abandoned while the goal of lowering debt-to-GDP ratio
to 25% was advanced to 2013–14, and the subsequent budgets moved the debt
target even closer to the present time.
30 International Monetary Fund (2005). Canada: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 05/116.
31 The benchmark group consisted of G7 countries, Australia, New Zealand, Netherland, Sweden and
Switzerland
32 International Monetary Fund (2005). Canada: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 05/116, p. 45.
33 Andrés, J. and Doménech, R. (2006). Fiscal Rules and Macroeconomic Stability, University of Valencia,
Hacienda Pública Española, 176-(1/2006), 9-42.
34 Guichard, S. et al. (2007), What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country Experiences, OECD
Economic Department Working Papers, No. 553.
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The study discussed at the beginning of this section (Section 4.2) concluded
that establishment of a no-deficit rule (or “balanced budget or better”) prompted
the government to incorporate an implicit caution in the budget forecasting
which served as an additional safeguard to already existing explicit caution in
the form of Contingency Reserve and Economic Prudence. It was suggested
that the implicit caution was driven by a much higher political cost that may
be associated with a small budget deficit compared to a much lower costs of a
large surprise surplus.
35
In 2006, the Conservative federal government admitted that larger than projected
budget surpluses had “eroded the credibility of the budget process and limited
the scope of parliamentarians and Canadians to debate alternative usesofsurplus
funds”.
36 Responding to these concerns, the federal government adopted a new
approach to budget planning and fiscal forecasting that included the following:
• The practice of adjusting the budget projections for economic prudence
was discontinued; Contingency Reserve and Economic Prudence were no
longer incorporated into the budget, whereas a planned debt reduction of
$3 billion a year was introduced.
• Budget projections continued to be based on the average forecast of private
sector economists, whereas the economic and fiscal projections of the
budget were to be presented over a two-year time horizon in order to allow
higher accountability of the government.
37
Moreover, if in the late 1990s and early 2000s the government was open about
not being “prepared to risk a return to deficits”;
38 similar statements are no
longer found in today’s government documents and speeches. However, as
was seen in Section 2.3, substantial surprise surpluses were reported in both
2006-07 and 2007-08 fiscal years and seem to be just a continuation of the
surplus practice started in the late 1990s.
Furthermore, the federal government identified the reduction of total
government’s net debt as one of Canada’s competitive economic advantages
and committed to reduce it to zero in less than a generation.
39 The total
government consists of federal and provincial-territorial governments, whereas
total government’s net debt is a combination of net debts of these governments.
A commitment to achieving something which is not fully under federal
government’s control may create an additional pressure for overachieving on
the component which is actually controlled by the government, namely the
federal public debt.
35 O’Neill, T. (2005). Review of Canadian Federal Fiscal Forecasting: Processes and Systems,
O’Neill Strategic Economics, p. 28 and 73.
36 Department of Finance Canada (2006). The Budget Plan, p.53.
37 Department of Finance Canada (2006). The Budget Plan, p. 53.
38 Department of Finance Canada (2000). The Budget Plan, p. 45.
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Although a planned debt reduction has recently been incorporated into the
budget projections, the history of the surplus years shows that surprise
components contributed some 67% out of the total of $105.8 billion debt
reduction that took place between 1997 and 2007. Moreover, in 2006 and
2007, the federal government planned to reduce public debt by only $6 billion,
while thanks to the large surprise surpluses the debt repayment in those two
years was supplemented by an additional $17.1 billion.There is hardly a doubt
that surprise surpluses become a great help to the federal government in
delivering on its promise in achieving the fiscal advantage.
Summing up the discussion, federal budget projections have been and remain
somewhat inaccurate. This is so for the budgetary revenues and expenses, but
also for the different components that make up revenue and spending. Canada’s
strong economy – a frequently assumed cause of surprise surpluses – does not
seem to be the decisive driving factor of the forecasting inaccuracy. Similarly,
while all countries face the same problem of “small misses”, Canada’s
forecasting accuracy is worse than that of other countries. This leads to a
conclusion that the invisible political pressure to avoid deficit may still play a
very important role in shaping surprise surpluses.
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It is not for nothing that public policy deliberation is called a “debate”. Unlike
areas where science may provide solid guidance for distinguishing between
alternate states and identify the most effective and efficient solutions leading
to optimal outcomes, there is no absolute accuracy in virtually any area of the
public policy. Economic and social studies depend heavily on the assumptions
employed and there are numerous examples when similar research questions
lead to conflicting conclusions. The pressure applied by different interest
groups is, by definition, focused on the interests of those specific groups.
Electorate pressure, in turn, may not reflect the very best approach in terms of
the economic efficiency or social fairness, but is a very strong determinant in
forming public policy.
Federal fiscal and budgetary policy is a highly visible subject of the public
policy debate, but it is also a particularly delicate area. Virtually any economic
agent, be it an individual, an enterprise, an industry or a jurisdiction, may have
something to gain or to lose from even minor changes in fiscal policy. Our
position may also depend on the hat we wear and the timeline that we
embrace. As responsible individuals, we may be compelled to oppose the cut
in the GST knowing the economic consequences of such a measure, but as
household constituents, we may well enjoy paying lower taxes at point of
retail sale. Similar, the technicalities of collecting budget revenues and
managing program spending are not always well understood by the outsiders
to the budgetary process. This may lead to wrong conclusions on what is
possible or impossible to implement. The complexity and multi-faceted
character of the fiscal policy creates certain limitations to the objectivity,
accuracy and encompassing quality of any research in this area.
Recognizing these limitations, we would concentrate on desired attitudes
towards the federal budget and budgetary balance.
It is interesting how the meaning of words changes over time. A call for a
balanced budget in the mid 1990s was definitely associated with a request to
eliminate the budget deficit. Conversely, in the late 2000s, the same call
conveys a request to abolish the practice of continuously reappearing surprise
budgetary surpluses.
When a planned surplus is incorporated into the budget projections, its
purpose is also assumed to be known. When a surprise surplus appears, it
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brings up a debate on the ways to spend it.Although the choice of alternatives
may seem to be diverse, it eventually narrows down to three possibilities:
increased spending, reduced taxation or repayment of the public debt.
Any of these options may be supported by solid arguments; however, one
major difference between them exists: paying down public debt may be
viewed as honouring an already incurred liability, whereas reducing taxes
and/or increasing program spending is a policy decision associated with
new liabilities.
Although federal surprise surpluses have been appearing regularly, their
level and presence in each fiscal year remains uncertain. It then seems to be
particularly worrisome that diminishing government’s revenue capacity or
increasing spending commitments may be based on something which may or
may not materialize in the future.
Using surprise surpluses for paying down debt may then emerge as the most
neutral option. If no surprise surplus appears, the debt status quo remains
unchanged, while a positive surprise surplus will bring benefits associated
with the debt reduction and it may well be justifiable to dedicate as much
as 1% of GDP (the size of the federal surplus in 2005-06 and 2006-07) to
this purpose.
The relentless endeavour for debt reduction may suggest that public debt is a
matter best to be avoided. The most often cited negative implications of the
public debt are decreased national savings which lead to increased net foreign
indebtedness and a lower capital stock due to high risk premium on interest
rate and lower private consumption. However, several benefits of having
public debt have also been identified. It is believed that the government debt
can enhance the liquidity of households by providing relatively safe saving
instrument, increasing private net asset position and easing borrowing
constraints.
40
Economic literature offers limited clarity on the optimal level of debt. One of
the extreme theories suggests that the size of the debt does not impose any
consequences on the allocation of resources as long the debt is either stable
or grows at a sustainable pace. A more moderate approach recommends
keeping tax rates relatively constant over time and adjusting the debt level in
a way that allows achieving this objective. Another theory focuses more on
intergenerational fairness and implies that the size of the debt should be chosen
in such a way as to distribute the burden evenly across generations.
41
40 James, S. and Karam, P. (2001). The Role of Government Debt in a World of Incomplete Financial
Markets, Department of Finance Canada, Working Paper 2001-01.
41 International Monetary Fund (2000). Canada: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/34.51
Given the complexities and importance of the decisions related to the possible
use of the excessive fiscal room, would not it be better to contain this debate
within the general budgetary process rather than on a year-by-year bases
depending on the size of the surprise surplus?
The federal budget is largely a function of the national and global economic
growth, changes in world prices and developments on the international
financial markets. In the same way as we are accustomed to fluctuating
business cycles, we must likewise allow the notion that government’s
budgetary balance may also fluctuate.Although the balanced budget should be
the focus of the government’s efforts, it cannot be truly achieved without
allowing for a risk of deficits as well as surpluses.
Our greatest parting advice is for the government to resist tinkering. While at
time of writing, there is a risk that the government could find itself in a deficit
within a couple of years, CGA-Canada would caution against balancing the
budget at all costs. Raising taxes or curbing spending would in our view
exacerbate the very triggers that might cause a deficit to begin with.And while
it is not our preference, Canada would have little difficulty in borrowing
money if ever the fiscal drain envisioned by some was to be faced. The fact of
the matter is that the planned surplus course should not be altered to
accommodate current indicators. Low stable inflation, dropping interest rates
and anticipated growth in the economy combined with the mix of Canada’s
CPI basket make any dramatic changes premature even in light of rising food
and energy costs.
And while some continue to be adverse to surprise surpluses, our advice is to
celebrate in those triumphs with a view to optimizing debt decline.
As an accounting association, we are naturally attracted to the prospect of
eliminating debt for the benefit of current and future stakeholders. We are also
more prone to controlling expenses with a view to investment and renewal and
prescribing tax revenue models which are most efficient (consumption) over
those which tax capital investment, innovation and productivity (capital,
income and sales).
More than ever, Canada must look at the economic long term. That long term
view looks to stabilization of the government tax base, responsible and
efficient program delivery and a continued diligence in drawing down the
debt; both with dedicated planned surpluses and with surprise surpluses when
they surface. This calls also for a culture of responsibility as the electorate
places enriched reliance on government for programs and services; especially
in these times of surplus.52
Government is a business and we need to allow it to be managed accordingly.
This calls for exhaustive budgeting and monitoring and also commands regular
forecasting for sake of corrective adjustment. All the while, Canadians want
some degree of constants and consistency. To that end, we are hopeful that the
right budgetary balance can be struck and that the budget process can be
improved to the extent possible. Due diligence and objectivity are being asked
from across government and we are confident that new measures such as those
introduced under the Federal Accountability Act can contribute. Specifically,
the appointment of a Parliamentary Budget Officer to provide independent
analysis on the state of the nation’s finances and the clarification of the
responsibilities of deputy ministers in relation to accounting and internal
auditing in federal government departments are welcomed. Taken also with
other enforcement measures introduced by the Act, the potential is there to
enhance accuracy and accountability. So back to the question at hand, yes as
we have entered the 21st century, the whole vernacular of surprise surpluses
may in fact have morphed into a more modern device of conservatism.
Within that new paradigm and in a stable economy, that new characterization
fundamentally persuades federal surprise surpluses to serve as both a surprise
and as an instrument of strategy.53
Over the surplus years, the federal government has introduced a number of
changes to the way that federal finances are accounted for and reported.
Below, we present the list of changes as well as the implications that they have
imputed to the analysis presented in this paper.
Changes in accounting policies and reporting format
The changes in the accounting policies and reporting format have been of a
different magnitude ranging from revising some definitions to changing the
whole accounting framework; however, for easier navigation, the list of
changes presented below is in chronological order.
1997-98 fiscal year: The government changed its method of accounting for
assistance to international financial institutions, and calculating interest costs
on obligations for public sector pensions. Under the new accounting rules, an
expenditure is recorded when a note payable is issued to an international
financial institution rather than when it is redeemed. Calculation of interest
charges became based on the actuarial obligations rather than superannuation
account balances.
2003-04 fiscal year: The government changed its basis of accounting from
modified accrual to full accrual. Under the full accrual accounting standard,
transactions and other events are recognized when they occur and not when
cash is received or paid. This is believed to make financial results more reflexive
of economic developments, and changes in the tax base and government
actions undertaken during the fiscal year. The change of the accounting
standard brought the following major modifications:
• Tax receipts and refunds are now recorded in the year in which the taxable
activity takes place. Previously, tax revenues were recorded in the year they
were received.
• Non-financial assets are now included in the government’s balance sheet.
Previously, the value of the government’s stock of capital assets was not
shown on the balance sheet.
• The annual cost of owning a capital asset is now estimated as depreciation
in the value of the asset. Previously, the full purchase price of a capital asset
was shown as an expenditure item in the year of purchase.
53
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• The list of liabilities is now extended to include cost of environmental
clean-ups of federal properties, increased liabilities for post-employment
benefits for federal employees and some other liabilities.
2005-2006 fiscal year: The government revised the definition of reporting
entity. The revised standard removed the criteria of accountability to and
ownership by the government and expanded the definition of control. As a
consequence, some organizations that were previously not part of the
government’s reporting entity have been included in the financial statements.
2006-2007 fiscal year: The government modified the rules of recording other
comprehensive income of Crown corporations. It is now excluded from the
corporations’ net income. In addition, the government adopted the practice
of presenting financial information in the budget and annual reports of fiscal
outcomes on a gross basis. Previously, budget forecasts and fiscal outcomes
were published on a net basis where certain disbursements were netted against
budgetary revenues and certain revenues were netted against expenses.
Analytical challenges caused by the accounting changes
For the purposes of this paper, the revisions to the accounting policies and
reporting formats pose two broad analytical challenges. The first relates to
analysing the historic trend of the budgetary balance, whereas the second
poses difficulty in assessing accuracy of budgetary projections.
Historic trend. The Fiscal Reference Tables published by the Department of
Finance Canada provide historic information on the financial position of the
federal government and cover the period between 1946-47 and 2006-07 fiscal
years. Due to the changes in the accounting standard from modified to full
accrual, the data in the Fiscal Reference Tables were revised to allow for
compatibility of historical comparisons; however, the revisions were only
made back to the 1982-83 fiscal year. This means that published data for the
years prior to 1982-83 are not directly comparable to more recent years.
Figure 1 in particular is affected by this difficulty. However, because the
purpose of Figure 1 is to show the general trend across the years rather than
the more precise levels of budgetary balance in each fiscal year, liberty has
been taken to combine on one chart the data based on modified and full
accrual accounting.
Accuracy of budgetary projections. Each year, the federal budget (as well as
budgetary projections) is presented based on the accounting policies available
at the time of presentation. The actual dollar amounts of the budgetary
components are published approximately 1.5 years after the projections were
first presented and may already be presented under different accounting rules.
Within the timeframe considered in this report (i.e. from 1997-98 to 2007-0855
fiscal years) the following factors affect the accuracy of comparing projections
to the actual budgetary outcomes:
• Projections for 2001-02 fiscal year were presented in December 2001,
when nearly three quarters of the fiscal year were already over. In this way,
the projections were largely based on already known actual amounts.
• Projections for 2002-03 fiscal year were based on the modified accrual
accounting framework whereas the actual data for that year are available on
full accrual framework only.
• Projections for 2005-06 fiscal year were based on a net basis whereas the
actual data for that year are available on gross basis only.
• The layered nature of changes in accounting rules and presentation format
does not allow for the use of one single source of data on actual budgetary
outcomes.
Charts presented in Figure 3, 8, 10-14 and 16 of this paper have been affected
by these difficulties. To mitigate these difficulties to the extent possible, the
following combination of data sources was used.
Budgetary projections for
1997-98 – 2001-02 and 2003-04 – 2007-08
Budgetary projections for
2002-03
Actual fiscal outcomes for
1997-98 – 2001-02
Actual fiscal outcomes for
2002-03 – 2004-05
Actual fiscal outcomes for
2005-06 – 2006-07
Actual fiscal outcomes for
2007-08
Variable Data Source
The Budget Plan for corresponding years
The Budget Plan 2001
Fiscal Reference Tables 2002 (the latest
publication where budgetary data are
presented on modified accounting basis)
Fiscal Reference Tables 2005 (the latest
publication where budgetary data are
presented on a net basis)
Fiscal Reference Tables 2007
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